APPSC Daily Current Affairs 3rd March 2026
Relevance: GS Paper II – Governance, Social Justice, Women Empowerment, Law & Order
Why in News?
- The Home Minister of Andhra Pradesh stated that crimes against women in the State have decreased by 4.4%.
- The announcement was made during the Women’s Safety Week rally held in Vijayawada, where the government highlighted measures taken to improve women’s safety and awareness.
- The Minister also unveiled the ‘Shakti Team’ brochure, emphasising preventive policing and community awareness.
Background and Context
Crimes against women remain a major governance and social justice issue in India. These crimes include:
- Domestic violence
- Sexual harassment
- Assault and rape
- Dowry-related offences
- Cyber-crimes targeting women
Ensuring women’s safety is linked to:
- Gender equality
- Social stability
- Constitutional guarantees of dignity and equality
In Andhra Pradesh, special initiatives have been introduced to strengthen monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.
Key Developments
- Reported 4.4% decline in crimes against women in Andhra Pradesh.
- Conduct of Women’s Safety Week awareness rally in Vijayawada.
- Launch of the Shakti Team brochure.
- Decision to open a sexual offender sheet against repeat offenders.
- Emphasis on equal upbringing and gender sensitisation.
Core Issues Involved
- Persistent gender-based violence.
- Social discrimination against women.
- Under-reporting of crimes.
- Need for preventive policing and awareness.
- Ensuring effective enforcement of laws.
Causes / Reasons Behind Improvement
- Strengthening of police surveillance.
- Community awareness programmes.
- Monitoring of repeat offenders.
- Focus on preventive measures rather than reactive action.
- Institutional support from Women’s Commission and district administration.
Implications
Political
- Strengthens government’s credibility on women’s safety.
- Promotes gender-sensitive governance.
Economic
- Safer environment encourages female workforce participation.
- Improves investment climate.
Social
- Enhances confidence among women and families.
- Promotes gender equality within households.
Legal / Institutional
- Reinforces strict action against offenders.
- Encourages use of preventive policing tools.
Institutional / Constitutional background
- Article 14 – Equality before law
- Article 15(3) – Special provisions for women
- Article 21 – Right to life and dignity
- Role of State Women’s Commission
- Criminal law provisions under IPC and related Acts
Government Response / Policy Measures
- Launch of Shakti Teams for women’s safety.
- Monitoring habitual offenders.
- Public awareness campaigns.
- Gender sensitisation initiatives.
- Community policing strategies.
Challenges / Concerns
- Possible under-reporting of crimes.
- Need for long-term behavioural change.
- Ensuring consistent implementation across districts.
- Cyber-crimes against women rising nationwide.
- Social stigma affecting reporting.
Way Forward
- Strengthen fast-track courts for crimes against women.
- Expand Shakti Teams across all districts.
- Improve cyber-crime monitoring units.
- Promote gender education in schools.
- Encourage community-based vigilance systems.
- Strengthen data transparency and periodic reporting.
Conclusion
The reported decline in crimes against women in Andhra Pradesh is a positive indicator of improved governance and enforcement. However, sustainable progress requires a combination of strict law enforcement, social reform, gender sensitisation, and institutional accountability.
Ensuring women’s safety is essential for achieving constitutional goals of equality, dignity, and social justice.
CARE MCQ
Q. With reference to measures for women’s safety in Andhra Pradesh, consider the following statements:
- The State reported a 4.4% decline in crimes against women.
- A sexual offender sheet mechanism has been proposed to monitor repeat offenders.
- Equal property rights for women were first introduced at the national level by a recent constitutional amendment.
Select the correct answer using the code given below:
(a) Only one
(b) Only two
(c) All three
(d) None
Answer: (b)
Explanation:
- Statement 1 is correct – A 4.4% decline was reported.
- Statement 2 is correct – Sexual offender sheet monitoring was announced.
- Statement 3 is incorrect – Equal property rights were introduced in Andhra Pradesh earlier under N.T. Rama Rao, not by a recent constitutional amendment.
Relevance: GS Paper II (International Relations; Global security) | GS Paper III (Defence technology; Internal security)
For Prelims:
- Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD), Patriot PAC-3 MSE, THAAD, SM-3, SM-6, Arrow-2, Arrow-3, David’s Sling, Stunner, Iron Dome, Tamir, Iron Beam, Cheongung II, IFPC, AIM-9X Sidewinder, Hit-to-Kill Technology, Proximity Fuse, Exo-atmospheric Interception, Endo-atmospheric Interception, Vertical Launch System, 360° Radar Coverage, Saturation Attack, Bavar-373, Arman BMD, Sevom-e-Khordad, Tor-M1, Directed Energy Weapons.
For Mains:
- Layered Defence, Deterrence by Denial, Cost Asymmetry, Interceptor Depletion, High-Tempo Warfare, Directed Energy Weapons, Defence Industrial Capacity, Arms Race, Strategic Stability, Escalation Control, Missile Proliferation, Alliance Integration.
Why in News?
- Fresh hostilities between a U.S.led coalition (including Israel and the UAE) and Iran have triggered a newly integrated regional air and missile defence network, different from the one used during the Twelve-Day War (June 2025).
- In 2025, the integrated air and missile defence faced Iran’s retaliation involving 500+ ballistic missiles and more than twice as many “suicide drones”. In the present conflict, the theatre includes the Persian Gulf, bringing in the UAE’s South Korean system and U.S. systems that were prototypes last year.
- While these systems display improved capability, they also show the operational challenge of “rationing” interceptors because of their high cost and the need to sustain stocks if the conflict prolongs.
Background and Context
Missile defence is a layered military capability designed to detect, track, and destroy incoming missiles before impact. It relies on:
- Sensors (satellites, ground radars) for detection and tracking
- Command and control systems for decision-making
- Interceptors (counter-missiles) to destroy the threat
Beyond protection, missile defence can:
- Deter missile-based coercion
- Buy decision time for political and military leaders during escalation
Key Developments
- Activation of an expanded IAMD network involving UAE + U.S. + Israel.
- UAE deploying Cheongung II for Gulf-specific threats.
- Wider operational use of THAAD and Patriot supplied by the U.S.
- U.S. deploying Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC) using AIM-9X Sidewinder to reduce reliance on Patriot.
- Israel using Iron Beam as primary defence against drone swarms to conserve Arrow 3 and Stunner.
- Iran employing layered systems such as Bavar-373 (Sayyad-4B), Arman BMD, Sevom-e-Khordad, Tor-M1, Majid, and Azarakhsh.
Core Issues Involved
- Cost and sustainability of firing expensive interceptors against cheaper threats.
- Saturation attacks aimed at exhausting interceptors.
- Stockpile depletion and slow replenishment rates.
- Operational limits: reload time leaves batteries temporarily exposed.
- Effectiveness challenges against decoys, evasive manoeuvres, drones, cruise missiles, and potentially stealth aircraft.
Causes / Reasons
- Iran’s large arsenal of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones.
- Conflict geography expanding into the Persian Gulf, increasing urgency for Gulf-state defence.
- Requirement to protect bases, cities, and critical assets using a multi-layered defence architecture.
- Escalation dynamics where missile attacks and counter-attacks are central instruments of war.
Implications
Political
- Deeper security coordination among U.S., Israel, and UAE.
- Missile defence becomes a tool shaping escalation control and alliance cohesion.
Economic
- Interceptor cost pressure: Patriot PAC-3 MSE costs about $4 million per shot.
- High operational tempo can create a financial drain and procurement stress.
Strategic
- Missile defence shifts conflict from “launching more missiles” to “who can sustain interceptors”.
- Greater reliance on directed energy (laser) systems to counter drones cheaply.
- Naval assets gain importance: U.S. deploying SM-6 in a dual role (terminal intercept + fast-attack craft).
Social / Environmental
- Reduced casualties when interceptions succeed.
- However, failures or saturation can lead to severe urban damage and humanitarian stress.
What is Missile Defence?
Missile defence is a system that finds and destroys incoming missiles before they reach targets.
- Sensors track missile speed and direction.
- Command centres compute threatened targets and select response.
- Interceptors are launched to destroy the incoming threat.
How an Interceptor Works (Patriot Example)
Patriot consists of connected components:
- Radar scans the sky using thousands of radio beams (stationary radar, not rotating).
- On detecting a threat, it achieves “lock”—continuous focused tracking.
- The Engagement Control Station (ECS) computes trajectory and decides when to fire.
- The launcher truck fires the interceptor.
- Radar tracks both target and interceptor; ECS sends guidance commands.
- Final phase uses onboard seeker.
- Interception occurs via:
- Proximity fuse + shrapnel warhead (older)
- Hit-to-kill collision (newer)
- Radar confirms destruction and resets to engage next threat.
How Effective are Interceptors?
- Iron Dome: effective against simple short-range rockets; reported 80–97% success in recent conflicts.
- Patriot: performance varies; once achieved 100% against six hypersonic Kinzhals in one night over Kyiv and 60%+ against Iskander-M ballistic missiles, but reportedly declined after Russia introduced decoys and sharp manoeuvres and attacked in larger swarms (reported drop to ~10%).
- U.S. homeland GMD programme: cited success rate of about 55% in highly scripted tests, including three misses in the last six.
What Makes Cheongung II Different?
The UAE uses Cheongung II to counter low-flying cruise missiles and tactical ballistic missiles over the Gulf. Key features:
- Hit-to-kill like Patriot, but optimised for Gulf threats.
- 360° firing: uses a Vertical Launch System and rotating multi-function radar.
- Solves Patriot’s older limitation: earlier Patriot radars scanned a 120° cone, requiring rotation if threats came from outside.
- Counters “skimmers” (very low-flying missiles) using a nose radar activated in the final seconds, reducing dependence on ground radar.
How Cost Shapes Interceptor Use
Iran’s saturation attack strategy aims to fire many cheaper weapons to exhaust expensive interceptors.
- Patriot PAC-3 MSE: ~$4 million per interceptor.
- To manage costs and stockpiles:
- U.S. deployed IFPC using AIM-9X Sidewinder as interceptors.
- U.S. Navy used SM-6 dual configuration for terminal ballistic intercept and fast-attack craft.
- Israel expanded Iron Beam (laser) against drone swarms to conserve higher-end interceptors like Arrow 3 and Stunner.
What Changed After the Twelve-Day War (2025)?
2025 layered defence sequence:
- First line (exo-atmospheric): Israel’s Arrow 3 + U.S. destroyers with SM-3 (intercepts in space before re-entry).
- Heavy barrages depleted stocks quickly by the second week.
- Endo-atmospheric: THAAD + Israel’s legacy Arrow 2.
- Mid layer: David’s Sling with Stunner.
- Last line: Patriot.
- Against suicide drones: Iron Dome (Tamir) + Iron Beam, supported by air-to-air missiles from U.S., UK, and France (Rafales).
Post-war, a key priority became replenishment. The U.S. has quadrupled production orders for THAAD and PAC-3 MSE and accelerated directed-energy deployment. Yet, production remains slower than combat consumption, and replenishing THAAD shortages may take at least 1.5 years at current capacity.
Iran’s Air and Missile Defence Capabilities
- Bavar-373 (Sayyad-4B): Iran’s most advanced interceptor, reportedly designed for ranges exceeding 300 km.
- Arman BMD: claimed optimisation for short- to medium-range ballistic missiles with 360° radar coverage.
- Sevom-e-Khordad: mobile system to counter cruise missiles and fighter jets; reportedly using Sayyad-3 to protect Natanz and Isfahan nuclear facilities.
- Tor-M1 (Russia-made): for precision-guided bombs.
- Majid and Azarakhsh: for low-flying drones and cruise missiles.
Operational limitation: after firing a batch (around six missiles), batteries need reload time, leaving them temporarily exposed. Reports of strikes in Tehran/Isfahan also raise questions about Bavar-373’s claimed stealth detection.
Facts for Prelims
- 500+ ballistic missiles used by Iran in the Twelve-Day War (2025).
- Iron Dome success rate: 80–97% (reported).
- PAC-3 MSE cost: ~$4 million per interceptor.
- GMD test success rate: ~55% (cited).
- Cheongung II: VLS + 360° radar, plus nose radar for endgame guidance.
Institutional / Legal
- Missile defence is part of state responsibility to protect citizens under national security frameworks.
- Defence procurement and deployment reflect strategic doctrines and alliance commitments.
- Raises wider concerns about arms escalation and stability within international norms governing force and security.
International / Geopolitical Dimension
- Emergence of a more integrated West Asian IAMD architecture involving U.S., Israel, UAE.
- UAE’s South Korean system reflects diversification of defence partnerships.
- Defence-industrial capacity (interceptor production) becomes a key geopolitical constraint in prolonged wars.
Government Response / Policy Measures
- U.S. has quadrupled production orders for THAAD and PAC-3 MSE.
- Accelerated deployment of directed-energy systems to naval platforms.
- Tactical shift toward rationing expensive interceptors using IFPC and lasers.
Challenges / Criticisms
- Interceptor exhaustion under saturation.
- High cost per shot compared to incoming cheap missiles/drones.
- Production bottlenecks: slow replenishment vs combat usage.
- Evolving threats: decoys, manoeuvres, skimmers, stealth, hypersonics.
- Reload vulnerability creating short windows of exposure.
Way Forward
- Expand defence industrial capacity for high-tempo replenishment.
- Increase deployment of directed-energy and lower-cost interceptors for drones/cheap threats.
- Improve multi-layer integration with better sensor fusion and real-time command systems.
- Strengthen regional de-escalation mechanisms to reduce prolonged high-intensity missile exchanges.
Conclusion
CARE MCQ
Q. The concept of “cost asymmetry” in missile defence, as observed in the U.S.–Iran conflict, refers to:
A. The use of low-cost lasers to counter high-end ballistic missiles.
B. The imbalance between the low cost of incoming drones/missiles and the high cost of interceptors used against them.
C. The difference in radar range between sea-based and land-based systems.
D. The higher cost of naval deployments compared to land-based batteries.
Answer: B
Explanation:
Cost asymmetry refers to the situation where relatively inexpensive offensive weapons such as drones or short-range missiles are countered using very expensive interceptors. For example, a Patriot PAC-3 MSE interceptor costs around $4 million per shot.
Saturation attacks exploit this imbalance by firing large numbers of cheaper weapons to deplete interceptor stockpiles. This creates financial strain, stockpile exhaustion, and operational vulnerability, especially during prolonged high-tempo warfare.
Relevance: GS Paper II (Bilateral relations; Groupings & agreements affecting India’s interests; India’s Middle East policy; strategic autonomy; conflict resolution in West Asia)
For Prelims:
- Axis of Resistance, Strait of Hormuz, JCPOA, Hezbollah, Hamas in Gaza, Houthis
For Mains:
- India’s balancing of relations with US, Israel, Iran, Gulf states; strategic autonomy; conflict resolution in West Asia
Why in News?
The US and Israel launched coordinated strikes on Iran, reportedly killing Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (a Shia cleric) and targeting key strategic facilities, while calling for regime change. The joint offensive—Operation Epic Fury (US) and Operation Lion’s Roar (Israel)—marked a major escalation in West Asian tensions.
Iran retaliated through Operation True Promise 4, launching missile attacks against Israel and nearby Gulf states. This escalation comes despite recent progress in US–Iran nuclear talks, raising fears of a wider West Asian conflict with serious global implications.
Background and Context
1979 Rupture
Before 1979, Iran and Israel were strategic allies. After the Iranian Revolution, the new Islamic regime severed ties with Israel and adopted a strongly anti-Western ideology. It branded the US the “Great Satan” and Israel the “Little Satan”, using anti-colonial and anti-imperialist rhetoric as a key element of its worldview.
Iran’s Nuclear Revelation
Tensions escalated in the early 2000s when the world discovered Iran’s secret nuclear program, increasing mistrust and security competition.
Regional Expansion and the “Axis of Resistance”
After the US-led overthrow of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, a power vacuum emerged. Iran built the “Axis of Resistance”—a network of allied proxy groups across the Middle East, including Hezbollah (Lebanon), Hamas (Gaza), and the Houthis (Yemen)—to counter US and Israeli dominance.
JCPOA (2015) and US Withdrawal (2018)
To curb Iran’s advancing covert nuclear program, the P5+1, the EU, and Iran signed the JCPOA (2015), offering sanctions relief in exchange for strict limits on uranium enrichment. The US withdrew in 2018, arguing the deal ignored Iran’s ballistic missile program and its funding of the Axis of Resistance. Iran then ramped up uranium enrichment, pushing close to weapons-grade capability.
Collapse of Buffers (2023–24) and 2025 Strikes
After the October 2023 Hamas attack, Israel’s multi-front campaign weakened Hamas, decapitated Hezbollah’s leadership, and contributed to the fall of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, stripping Iran of key buffers. In Operation Midnight Hammer (June 2025), Israel struck nuclear sites at Natanz and Isfahan; the US later joined using B-2 bombers and bunker-buster bombs to strike the fortified Fordow facility. The US claimed severe damage to Iran’s nuclear facilities aimed at delaying its nuclear programme.
Key Developments
Coordinated US–Israel strikes (Feb 2026)
- Operations: Operation Epic Fury (US) and Operation Lion’s Roar (Israel).
- Reported outcome: killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and targeting strategic facilities.
Iran’s retaliation
- Operation True Promise 4: missile attacks against Israel and nearby Gulf states.
Escalation despite nuclear talks
- The conflict deepened even as US–Iran nuclear engagement had seen recent progress.
Core Issues Involved
- Nuclear concerns and the limits of diplomacy under heightened threat perceptions
- Regime change calls versus regional sovereignty and stability
- Missile and drone threats and the evolving nature of air defence
- Maritime chokepoints and global economic vulnerability
- Proxy networks and multi-front escalation dynamics
Causes / Reasons
Why did the US–Israel attack occur?
- The US was dissatisfied with the limited impact of the 2025 strikes and cited Iran’s continuing nuclear ambitions.
- Iran’s large arsenal of ballistic missiles and kamikaze drones was viewed as an intolerable threat to US forces in the Gulf and regional allies.
- Unlike earlier operations focused on deterrence, the February 2026 strikes aimed at decapitation.
- Washington reportedly calculated that removing the Supreme Leader could fracture the highly centralized Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
- The action was driven by a complex mix of nuclear concerns, ambitions for regime change, domestic political pressure, deterrence calculations, and escalating strategic commitments.
Implications
Global
1) Threat to Global Energy Security
The escalation heavily impacts the Strait of Hormuz, a vital maritime chokepoint. The strait handles approximately 20 million barrels of crude oil daily (roughly 20% of global consumption) and 20–30% of global LNG shipments. Any blockade or mining could paralyze energy markets and cause a massive spike in crude oil prices.
2) Geopolitical Polarization
The conflict risks drawing in other global powers. Russia and China may deepen alignment with Iran, while the US consolidates its Western and Arab allies—further polarizing the global order.
3) Disruption of Global Supply Chains
Militarization of West Asian skies and waters disrupts crucial trade routes connecting Asia to Europe, increasing freight and insurance costs globally.
4) Commodity and Market Volatility
With major traders suspending energy shipments, the conflict increases the “war premium”. Gold prices surge as investors seek safety, and stock markets in Dubai and Abu Dhabi halt trading.
India
1) Energy Security and Economy
- India is the world’s third-largest crude oil consumer and imports 85–88% of its needs.
- About 2.5–2.7 million barrels/day of oil from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Kuwait passes through Hormuz.
- 80–85% of LPG and nearly 60% of LNG imports also transit through Hormuz.
Near-term position: India’s immediate oil needs are “covered for now” (likely due to strategic petroleum reserves and diversified imports from Russia).
Key vulnerability: India lacks large strategic reserves for LPG and LNG, unlike crude oil. Spot availability of LPG and LNG is limited, making disruptions harder to manage.
If disruption is prolonged: Oil could rise above USD 100 per barrel, sharply raising India’s import bill. While short-term needs may be manageable, a long conflict could widen the current account deficit, fuel inflation, and strain the economy.
2) Safety of the Indian Diaspora
West Asia hosts nearly 9 million Indian expatriates, who contribute significantly to inward remittances. Diaspora safety becomes the primary concern, and India may need evacuation operations similar to Operation Rahat or Operation Ajay.
3) Diplomatic Tightrope
India has deep strategic partnership with the US and Israel, while also maintaining crucial historical, energy, and connectivity ties with Iran. A partisan stance is detrimental. The challenge is advocating peace and condemning civilian casualties without alienating strategic partners.
4) Disruption of Connectivity Corridors
Militarization derails India’s connectivity initiatives:
- Chabahar Port operations are jeopardized.
- The IMEC faces existential viability threats due to destruction of Arabian Peninsula port infrastructure.
Challenges / Criticisms
- Structural vulnerability in LPG and LNG due to limited strategic reserves and thin spot markets.
- Managing inflation and external sector stress if energy prices rise sharply.
- Maintaining balanced diplomacy amid pressure from competing partners.
- Protecting diaspora and shipping under a fast-moving military situation.
Way Forward
Build buffers beyond crude
- Develop stronger national buffers for LPG and LNG (on lines comparable in intent to crude SPR).
Strengthen maritime preparedness
- Expand protection missions for merchant shipping near conflict zones.
- Improve evacuation corridors and inter-agency coordination.
Diversify supply and reduce choke dependence
- Aggressively explore non-Gulf sources for LPG/LNG (US, Australia) as stated.
Sustain strategic autonomy
- Maintain diplomatic balance; keep dialogue channels with all sides.
- Prioritise protection of citizens, trade routes, and connectivity projects.
Domestic shock absorption
- Use targeted fiscal interventions (excise/VAT adjustments) to manage inflationary transmission.
Conclusion
The 2026 West Asian escalation exposes India’s vulnerabilities in energy security and diaspora safety. By maintaining strategic autonomy and acting as a stabilising, non-partisan voice for peace—embodying the role of a Vishwa Bandhu (global friend)—India can protect its interests while reinforcing that this is not an era of war.
UPSC PYQ
Q. What is “Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD)”, sometimes seen in the news?
A. An Israeli radar system
B. India’s indigenous anti-missile programme
C. An American anti-missile system
D. A defence collaboration between Japan and South Korea
Answer: C
CARE MCQ
Q. Bavar-373, recently seen in the context of the US–Israel–Iran conflict, is best described as:
A. A short-range anti-drone laser defence system
B. A long-range air defence system capable of intercepting aircraft and ballistic missiles
C. A sea-based interceptor designed for midcourse missile defence
D. A mobile artillery rocket system used for ground assaults
Answer: B
Explanation:
Bavar-373 is an Iranian long-range air defence system. It is designed to intercept aircraft and ballistic missiles and is considered comparable to advanced surface-to-air missile systems.
It forms part of Iran’s layered air defence architecture aimed at protecting strategic assets and critical facilities.
It is not a laser-based system (like Iron Beam), nor a sea-based interceptor (like SM-3), nor an artillery rocket system.